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Introduction
This paper proposes an approach and investigates its implications in arbitrating disputes between two parties. The disputes, which can be quite unrestricted in scope, are exemplified by the following two problems. Problem 1. Consider a negotiation problem between the United States and a foreign country over the conditions under which the U.S. may establish a military base in the foreign country (Barclay and Peterson 1976) . Several basic issues can be identified as the major elements of the dispute: the duration of the treaty, the civil jurisdiction, the number of years before the U.S. must commit itself to a large-scale construction of new permanent buildings, the degree to which the U.S. will be able to exercise its military forces in the defense of the base, and the degree to which the U.S. is obligated to provide protection for the host country in the event of an attack by an external power. The parties may have their own, often conflicting, preferences for the various possible issues. These preferences, modeled through conditional utilities, can then be combined to construct the set of the feasible joint utility evaluations for all possible treaties.
Problem 2. A conflict situation may also arise in the context of a group of individuals who proceed to conduct business. Many decisions may be made by the group under uncertainty, and these decisions will affect the income of the group and hence of the individual members themselves. When the group members differ in their attitudes toward risk, which can be captured through von Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) utility functions, as well as in their probability assessments concerning the joint payoff, they may not always evince unanimity of preference regarding (a) how to share the risk and (b) how to choose among opportunities presented to them by the external world (Wilson 1968 , Jennergren 1980 . Hence, an arbitrator might be called upon to resolve the dispute.
For dyadic problems such as those in the examples, the conflict situation can be represented graphically by the set of all achievable joint utilities or expected utilities.
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We shall use the generic term "evaluation" to mean that the parties evaluate their possible settlements either in terms of utilities or expected utilities. Once the arbitration problem is represented in the joint evaluation space, as shown in Figure 1 , attention should be restricted to the Pareto-optimal frontier, which is defined as the locus of achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are possible. Several arbitration approaches have been proposed in the game-theoretic literature to resolve the dispute and choose a particular point (i.e., settlement) on the Pareto-optimal frontier. A number of them are discussed by Raiffa (1982, pp. 235-250) , who illustrates them quite lucidly with a series of examples.
A solution concept in the spirit of decision analysis has been proposed by LaValle (1978, pp. 507-515). He suggests that the arbitrator should examine first a simpler problem of how sure payoffs y are to be allocated to the individual disputants, rather than flounder with the actual arbitration problem and all of its complexities. Once the simpler problem is resolved, the arbitrator can construct a solution to the actual problem. We refer to the allocation of sure payoffs as a simpler problem in contrast to, for instance, Problem 2 where the joint payoff to be allocated is uncertain and the parties differ in their probability assessments. We show later (in ?4) how the solution to the simpler problem can be employed to resolve the more complex problem. LaValle notes "this focusing of attention on ancillary hypothetical problems is similar in spirit to methods suggested (in decision analysis) for quantifying preferences and judgments (separately)".
LaValle further proposes that the determination of how to allocate any sure payoffs to the individual parties can be represented by a function called an allocation function. Once an allocation function has been determined, it can then be substituted back in the disputants' utility functions, to give rise to a trajectory in the set of the parties' feasible joint evaluations. The point at which the trajectory intersects the Paretooptimal boundary of this set is the proposed allocation-function-determined arbitrated solution to the dispute (see Figure 1) . Less formally, once the allocation funtion is determined, the disputants are counseled to find a Pareto-optimal settlement in the actual problem that will give every party the same satisfaction (i.e., utility) as it would reap from the problem of having some sure payoff to allocate via the already-arbitratedfor allocation function. LaValle (1978) then presents and discusses some appealing implications for disputants adhering to the allocation-function-determined arbitrated solution.
Kalai ( Once an allocation function is determined, it can be substituted in the individual utility functions to yield a trajectory u(a(y)) = {ul(a(y)), u2(a(y))} in the space of the parties' joint evaluations. As noted earlier, the point at which the trajectory intersects the Pareto-optimal frontier is the proposed solution to the dispute.
To determine systematically, and, in a sense, fairly, allocation functions, we propose a modification for the procedure presented by Eliashberg and Winkler (1981) . More specifically, the procedure we suggest requires the assessment of the parties' von Neumann-Morgenstem (vN-M) individual utility functions; the construction of a group utility function which captures their collective preferences; the derivation of optimal individual payoffs that maximize the collective preferences; and the transformation of these payoffs into an allocation function. We note that unlike the Eliashberg and Winkler (1981) work, which focuses on problems in which individuals who have to make collective decisions under uncertainty agree on the probability distributions of interest, in this paper the scope is expanded to situations where the parties, having different probability distributions, are required to make such collective decisions.
More 
Derivation of Allocation Functions-A Proposed Procedure
The arbitration approach proposed here involves the following steps:
Step 1. Determine ui(xl0i, ki) for i = 1, 2.
Step 2. Construct uG(x) = XIuI(x) + X2u2(x).
Step 3. Obtain xi(y) = dMi(y) + s0 by solving: max uG(x) = XIuI(x) + X2u2(x).
{X1 ,X2:X1+X2=y}
Step 4 
For this utility function, LaValle has derived the set of Pareto-optimal sharing rules in situations where parties may differ in their probability assessments over the uncertain joint payoff. Finally, concave utility functions where each party cares only for his (her) own payoff, ui(x1, x2) = ui(xi), can also, of course, be treated by the approach proposed here.
To demonstrate the nature of some allocation functions that the arbitrator may encounter, we consider now two illustrative examples. 
Derivation of Allocation Functions-Examples
Unlike the previous example, it can be seen that in this case s*' = 0 for any pair (X1, X2), and the arbitrator needs to determine XI and X2 through an indifference judgment between sure alternatives involving a tradeoff between ul and u2 (see Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Chapter 10).
We turn now to an investigation of the implications of the proposed arbitration procedure for various classes of multiattribute group utility functions.
Implications of the Arbitration Approach
As suggested, once d*(y) is determined, either through an actual assessment of X1 and X2 or by setting the side-payment under certainty equal to zero, it gives rise to a trajectory u(d*(y)) = {ul(d*(y)), u2(d*(y))} in the space of the parties' joint evaluations. The point at which the trajectory intersects the Pareto-optimal boundary of the actual problem is the proposed arbitrated solution to the problem. Thus, ul(y) and u2(y) are given in parametric equations form, from which u2 can be characterized as a function of ul. If, for example, u2 = ul, the proposed arbitration approach recommends equal evaluations. This, however, will not necessarily always be the case. In this section, we investigate this issue and characterize the nature of the solution implied by the arbitration approach, by studying the derivative of the trajectory, du2/dul, for various multiattribute utility functions satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1. We begin with perhaps the most popular one, the additive form. PROOF. See Appendix. From (15), the arbitration trajectory will approach u2 = u1 and provide an equalevaluations solution for increasing ratios of rGl(d*)/rG2(d2), as k22u22(dJ) approaches k12u'12(dt). That is, as the collective risk aversion with respect to party 1 increases (relative to that with respect to party 2), the equal-evaluations solution can be achieved as the parties' weighted marginal utilities for party 2's payoffs become more and more similar. On the other hand, for higher collective risk aversion with respect to party 2, relative to 1, the equal-evaluations solution can be achieved for the similar weighted marginal utilities with respect to party l's payoffs. 
Determination of Arbitration Trajectories-Examples EXAMPLE 1 (continued). To illustrate the insight that can be obtained via Proposition
That is, the trajectory in this case has a constant slope which depends upon the actually assessed aggregation weights (X1, X2).
Additive group utility functions are convenient to work with, but they do not necessarily reflect collective preferences under uncertainty concerning the ex-post equity of the individual utilities. One of the advantages of the approach presented in this paper is its ability to take such collective preferences into account without sacrificing Pareto-optimality. We characterize now the arbitration trajectory for another possible class of collective preferences, multilinear group utility functions, which can reflect preferences concerning ex-post equity. The group utility function for (xl, x2) is said to be multilinear if it can be expressed in the form UG(X1, x2) = kGluGl(xl) + kG2uG2(x2) + kGkGlkG2uGl(xl)uG2(x2). 
We note that the example demonstrates that arbitrating disputes between two parties, each having a different exponential utility function and different probability assessment with respect to the uncertain joint payoff, involves a zero ex-ante side payment under conditions of uncertainty as well as certainty. In fact, this result holds for any PJy1] and gi (i = 1, 2). Recalling that the pair (X1, X2) denotes the aggregation weights needed to determine the allocation function under certainty (i.e., the slope of the line tangent to the frontier of the problem under certainty), it can be shown, by using Example 2 (equation (6) 
and the different probabilities were still the same as in Table 1 To gain insight into the sensitivity of the proposed arbitration solution with respect to the individual probability assessments, the following scenarios have been considered. I. Exponential Utility Functions. ui(xi) = 1 -Exp(-gixi) for risk aversion measures gl = 0.04, g2 = 0.06, and uncertain joint payoffs Yi = 50, Y2 = 100.
As Table 2 shows, the slopes of the lines tangent to the Pareto-optimal frontiers of the problems under certainty and uncertainty are always the same. The individual expected utilities are always equal as recommended by the proposed arbitration approach. The Pareto-optimal payoffs under uncertainty depend on the individual probability assessments. Holding, for instance, individual l's probability assessment fixed at 0.25 and varying individual 2's assessment of the likelihood of occurrence for Yi (from 0.25 to 0.50 and 0.75), we note that individual 2's share of Yi (Y2) increases (decreases) because his side-bet component of the payoff increases (decreases).
II. Logarithmic Utility Functions. ui(xi) = ln (1 + xi) (i = 1, 2), for uncertain joint payoffs Yi = 50, Y2 = 100. Table 3 illustrates the changes in the slopes of the lines tangent to the Paretooptimal frontiers of the various problems under uncertainty. Unlike the case of exponential utilities, here ,ul and A12 vary with the probability assessments. Again, the expected utilities are always equal as recommended, and the individual's shares of the uncertain joint payoffs increase as their respective side-bet components increase.
Concluding Remarks
The arbitration approach developed in this paper deals with situations in which two parties face disputes which can be quite unrestricted in scope. However, it is essential that they be represented in the feasible joint-evaluation space, utilities or expected utilities. Once they are so represented, attention should be restricted to selecting a settlement from the Pareto-optimal frontier, which is the locus of achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are possible. Our approach can then guide an arbitrator in choosing such a settlement.
To implement the arbitration procedure proposed here, it appears that several conditions have to be met. Raiffa (1982, pp. 235-250) highlights some of the considerations that the arbitrator has to take into account in reaching a fair solution. He does it through a hypothetical but interesting dialogue between the arbitrator and an analyst who obtains the necessary inputs and prepares the data for analysis. It seems that a necessary condition for a truly fair and, hopefully, mutually acceptable resolution of disputes, whenever the analysis is based on utilities, is either that the parties reveal truthfully their preferences or that they are uncertain about the specific arbitration mechanism to be employed.
Suppose, for example, that the arbitrator has decided to adopt the Nash (1950) bargaining solution. Then, it has been shown by Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler (see Roth 1979 , Theorem 5) that the utility which the Nash solution assigns to a party in a two-person game increases as the other party exhibits more risk aversion. Hence, the parties have an incentive to misrepresent their true risk aversion, if they know that the arbitrator will indeed employ the Nash solution in resolving their dispute. Similar scenarios may hold for the arbitration approach proposed here. If, on the other hand, the parties are uncertain about the arbitration procedure, incentives to hide true preferences do not necessarily exist. This issue has been examined recently by Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984) through an empirical study which indicates that, in general, disputants are indeed uncertain about the arbitrator's behavior and his conflict resolution mechanism. This issue suggests an interesting direction for further research.
Another issue concerning the implementability of the proposed approach has to do with the measurement of the individual multiattribute utility functions and the modeling of their collective preferences through an appropriate choice of a gruop utility function.
The individual utility functions can be assessed by considering preferences among lotteries involving x. Since x is multidimensional, the utility-assessment procedures discussed in Keeney and Raiffa (1976) are relevant here. In particular, it is desirable to consider the applicability of various preferential assumptions (e.g., additive or mutual utility independence) that may simplify the form of the utility functions.
Once the individual utility functions have been assessed, they have to be aggregated to form a group utility function. The linear aggregation rule involves interpersonal comparison of utilities via tradeoffs among the dimensions of u = (ul, u2). This is not easy to do in practice. However, as has been shown, there are situations in which the arbitrator will not have to actually assess the aggregation weights X1 and X2. Our procedure provides him with guidance as to what X1 and X2 "should" be. For situations where actual assessment is needed, the literature reports some encouraging applications (Dyer and Miles 1976; Fisher and von Winterfeldt 1978; Keeney 1977 ).
Finally, we have shown that our proposed arbitration approach may yield a welldefined and operationalized constant-slope-trajectory solution similar, for instance, to Kalai's (1977) proportional solution. There may be other general situations where bargaining solutions such as Nash, mid-mid, equitil, or balanced increments (Raiffa 1982 , pp. 235-250) coincide with solutions implied by our approach. This issue also deserves further research attention.
